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Abstract. Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) extends traditional
Access Control by considering an access request as a set of pairs attribute
name-value, making it particularly useful in the context of open and
distributed systems, where security relevant information can be collected
from different sources. However, ABAC enables attribute hiding attacks,
allowing an attacker to gain some access by withholding information.
In this paper, we first introduce the notion of policy resistance to at-
tribute hiding attacks. We then propose the tool ATRAP (Automatic
Term Rewriting for Authorisation Policies), based on the recent formal
ABAC language PTaCL, which first automatically searches for resistance
counter-examples using Maude, and then automatically searches for an
Isabelle proof of resistance. We illustrate our approach with two simple
examples of policies and propose an evaluation of ATRAP performances.
Keywords: Attribute-based Access Control, Monotonicity, Attribute
hiding, Model Checking, Proof assistant
1 Introduction
An authorisation policy for a security mechanism is a document describing which
user requests are authorised and which ones are denied. Many languages exist
in the literature to define policies, most of them considering a request as a triple
subject-object-mode. Recent approaches [22, 21, 10] consider more expressive re-
quests, consisting of a set of pairs of attribute name and attribute values, thus
defining the model known as Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC).
A major feature of ABAC is its ability to gather attribute information from
different sources. This is essential in open and distributed systems, which indeed
often lack a central security point providing all required information. In order
to make a security decision, such systems need to combine information from
different sources including the user herself (e.g., personal identification), the
? Work partially supported by the International Exchange Scheme of the Royal So-
ciety and conducted in part at Imperial College London where A. Griesmayer was
supported by the Marie Curie Fellowship “DiVerMAS” (FP7-PEOPLE-252184).
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environment (e.g., date or location), the data requested (e.g., relationship with
other objects) and other users (e.g., availability of higher-ranked users).
Delegating the retrieval of security relevant information clearly brings more
flexibility in open systems, but also raises the problem of information withhold-
ing, malicious or not. Tschantz and Krishnamurthi introduce in [23] the notion
of safety, such that a policy is safe when “incomplete requests should only result
in a grant of access if the complete one would have”. More recently, Crampton
and Morisset identify in [10] the notion of an attribute hiding attack, where a
user hides some attribute values in order to get access to a resource she would
be denied otherwise.
As a running example to illustrate our research problem, consider a fictional
organisation, sponsored by both Austria and France, where documents can be
submitted and reviewed. The organisation has a simple conflict-of-interest pol-
icy stating that a document cannot be reviewed by someone with the same
nationality as the submitter. The implementation of such a policy might lead
to attribute hiding attacks: Consider a policy for a document submitted by an
Austrian member that states that it cannot be accessed by another Austrian
member; If an Austrian attacker is able to hide her nationality, for instance by
corrupting the corresponding data, then she could access the document. Such
an attack is particularly relevant when a user can have multiple nationalities.
In this paper, we focus on the behaviour of authorisation policies when facing
attribute hiding attacks. More precisely, we introduce the notion of resistance:
a policy is resistant when every query obtained by adding information to an
allowed query is also allowed. This definition generates the following research
questions:
1. Is it possible to automatically detect whether a policy is resistant or not?
2. If a policy is not resistant, can we exhibit a counter-example?
3. If a policy is resistant, can we construct a formal proof of it?
The main contribution of this paper is to positively answer these questions, at
least in a partial way. In order to do so, we present the tool ATRAP (Automated
Term Rewriting for Authorisation Policies), which combines the term-rewriting
tool Maude [8] and the proof assistant Isabelle/Isar [19, 24] to analyse the resis-
tance of PTaCL policies. The core of the tool is written in Java and handles the
communication between Maude and Isabelle by generating the respective inputs
and interpreting their results. ATRAP is capable of generating counter-examples
for non resistant policies, and of building an Isabelle proof for resistant policies.
Although ATRAP is sound, i.e., all counter-examples and proofs generated are
indeed correct, ATRAP is not (yet) complete, as it may fail in some cases to
find a counter-example in a reasonable amount of time or to build a proof.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2. we present the
language PTaCL and introduce its evaluation in Maude. In Section 3, we define
the notion of policy resistance and show how this property can be verified in
practice. In Section 4, we describe our approach to find a counter-example of
resistance, and in Section 5, we present how a proof of resistance can be automat-
ically generated, after which we conclude and present future work in Section 6.
Related work
The notion of resistance introduced in this paper is related to that of safety given
in [23], which roughly states that the evaluation of a request should be “lower”
than that of a request with strictly more information. This notion is close to
that of (weak)-monotonicity [10]. As shown in Section 3, a (weakly) monotonic
policy is also resistant, while the converse does not always hold.
There exist several approaches using model-checking to analyse access con-
trol policies [14, 26]. For instance, SMT solving can be used to check whether a
given request can eventually be granted with a particular role in Administrative-
RBAC policies [1, 2]. Similarly, XACML policies can be automatically compared
using a SAT solver [15]. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to auto-
matically analyse the resistance of policy, and also to allow for the generation of
a structured proof.
The automation of ATRAP relies on term-rewriting, which has already been
considered for the formalisation of access control [3, 11], leading to the analysis
of rewrite-based policies [17]. In particular, Bertolissi and Uttha propose in [4]
to relate the properties of a rewrite system, such as totality or consistency, with
those of an access control policy encoded in this system. This approach allow
them to use the rewrite system CiME to generate proof certificates for these
properties in the proof assistant CoQ. We follow a similar objective here, in that
we generate proof certificates using a rewrite system, however we focus on the
notion of resistance, which is not a property of the rewrite system itself, but of
the policy.
ATRAP relies on the encoding of PTaCL in Isabelle, mentioned in [10], in
order to generate a proof of resistance. Brucker et al. present in [6] an encoding of
an access control model into HOL, in the context of healthcare policies. Finally,
it is worth mentioning that some of the techniques used in ATRAP are inspired
by previous work [13], where the basic idea of using term-rewriting to generate
proofs is used in the context of program refinement.
2 PTaCL
XACML 3.0 [21] is an OASIS standard for representing authorisation policies,
and given an access request, its complete request evaluation cycle can be sum-
marised as follows: (i) the request is submitted to the Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP); (ii) the PEP forwards the request to the Context Handler (CH); (iii) the
CH collects all attributes necessary to the evaluation of the request; (iv) the CH
forwards the complete request to the Policy Decision Point (PDP); (v) the PDP
evaluates the complete request and returns the corresponding decision to the
CH, which returns it to the PEP.
PTaCL [10] formalises the evaluation of the request by the PDP, which con-
siders each request as complete, or more precisely, cannot make a distinction
between incomplete and complete requests. In other words, if the CH is unable
to collect some attributes, and forwards an incomplete request to the PDP, this
request is evaluated in the same way than a complete one.
Fig. 1. Binary and unary operators on the target decision set {1, 0,⊥}
u 1 0 ⊥
1 1 0 ⊥
0 0 0 ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
unionsq 1 0 ⊥
1 1 1 ⊥
0 1 0 ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
(a) Weak operators
u˜ 1 0 ⊥
1 1 0 ⊥
0 0 0 0
⊥ ⊥ 0 ⊥
u˜nionsq 1 0 ⊥
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 ⊥
⊥ 1 ⊥ ⊥
(b) Strong operators
X ¬X ∼X
1 0 1
0 1 0
⊥ ⊥ 0
(c) Unary
We present in this section the language PTaCL through the description of
an illustrative example. We introduce the different definitions required for the
understanding of this example, and refer to [10] for further details about the
language. We take as example the one given in the introduction, where the
access to a document is based on the nationality of the requester.
2.1 3-valued Logic
The 3-valued logic extends the traditional Boolean logic {1, 0}, where 1 repre-
sents true and 0 represents false, by considering an additional value ⊥ [18]. The
usual Boolean operators, such as the conjunction, disjunction, negation, etc, can
be extended to the set {1, 0,⊥}, as shown in Fig. 1. The weak operators consider
the value ⊥ as absorbing, while the strong ones “resolve” ⊥ as much as possible.
The logic {1, 0,⊥, u˜nionsq,∼,¬} is proven in [10] to be functionally complete, using
a result from Jobe [16], which means that any logical operator can be built
from these operators and constants. In the following, we sometimes use the set
{1, 0,⊥, u˜,∼,¬}, since x u˜ y = ¬(¬x u˜nionsq ¬y). In addition, we use the three valued
logic both to represent the result of target evaluation and the result of policy
composition. In order to avoid any confusion, we use {1T, 0T,⊥T} for the former,
and {1P, 0P,⊥P} for the latter, whose meaning will be given in due course.
2.2 Target and Policy
Following recent work [22, 21], PTaCL is attribute-based, meaning that a request
is modeled as a set of attribute name-value pairs. Our running example uses an
attribute nat, whose value can be either FR or AT. For instance, the request
{(nat,FR)} represents a request made by a French national.
In addition, PTaCL is target-based [5, 7, 9, 20, 21, 25], meaning that an access
control policy contains a target that specifies the requests to which the policy
is applicable, and a body (either a single decision or another policy) describing
how applicable requests should be evaluated.
In its simplest form, an atomic target is a pair (n, v), where n is an attribute
name and v is an attribute value. For instance, the target (nat,FR) evaluates
to 1T (match) if the request contains (nat,FR), to 0T (no-match) if it contains
(nat,AT), but not (nat,FR), and to ⊥T (indeterminate) if it does not contain
any value for the attribute nat. In other words, PTaCL can distinguish between
Table 1. PTaCL evaluation
t1 p1 t2 p2
∅ ⊥T {1P, 0P} ⊥T {1P, 0P}
{(nat,FR)} 0T {1P} 1T {1P}
{(nat,AT)} 1T {0P} 0T {0P}
{(nat,FR), (nat,AT)} 1T {0P} 1T {1P}
a non-matching value for an attribute and a missing attribute. More formally,
the semantics of an atomic target (n, v) for a request q = {(n1, v1), · · · , (nk, vk)}
is given as:
J(n, v)K(q) =

1T if (n, v
′) ∈ q and v = v′,
⊥T if (n, v′) 6∈ q,
0T otherwise.
More complex targets can be built using the logical operators notT, for the
negation of a target, optT, for the optional target (i.e., transform ⊥T into 0T)
and andP, for the strong conjunction of targets, interpreted by ¬, ∼ and u,
respectively. Since this set of operators is functionally complete (u can be built
from u˜nionsq and ¬ [10]), any other logical combination can be achieved with them.
Finally, an authorisation policy can be defined as single decision, i.e., either
1P (allow) or 0P (deny), a targeted policy (t, p), where t is a target, or a logi-
cal composition of two policies, using the operators notP for the negation of a
policy, dbdP for the deny-by-default of a policy, or andP for the conjunction of
two policies, interpreted by ¬, ∼ and u˜, respectively. Here again, these three
operators suffice to build any other logical operator. Given an access request,
the evaluation of a policy returns the set of all possible decisions. The logical
operators are therefore extended in a point-wise way, and the evaluation of a
targeted policy (t, p) for a request q is given by:
J(t, p)KP(q) =

JpKP(q) if JtKT(q) = 1T,
{⊥P} if JtKT(q) = 0T,
{⊥P} ∪ JpKP(q) otherwise.
where ⊥P represents the not-applicable decision. For instance, the policy p1 that
explicitly denies any access to Austrian citizens and otherwise allows the access
can be defined as:
t1 :: (Tatom "nat" "AT")
p1 : Pnot (Pdbd (Pnot (Ptar t1 (Patom Zero))))
We adopt a declarative syntax, where the double-colon is used for target defini-
tion, and a single-colon for policy definition. In the above, the target t1 is defined
as the atomic target (nat,AT) with the keyword Tatom, Patom Zero represents the
atomic policy that always returns 0P (whereas One represents the decision 1P),
Ptar t1 (Patom Zero) is the above policy guarded by the target t1, and thus evalu-
ates to: {0P} if t1 evaluates to 1T; to {⊥P} if t1 evaluates to 0T; and to {0P,⊥P}
if t1 evaluates to ⊥T. Furthermore, Pnot and Pdpd defines the negation and deny-
by-default operators, and therefore the constructor Pnot (Pdbd (Pnot x)) acts as
an allow-by-default operator, i.e., transforms ⊥P to 1P. Similarly, the policy p2
that explicitly authorises any access to French citizens and otherwise denies the
access can be defined as:
t2 :: (Tatom "nat" "FR")
p2 : Pdbd (Ptar t2 (Patom One))
The evaluation of p1 and p2 for four different requests is given in Table 1. Note
that the evaluation might return more than one decision, which can be inter-
preted as an inconclusive decision. In XACML, such decisions are defined by
the Indeterminate decision. The way an inconclusive decision is concretely inter-
preted by the PEP is left to the implementer, and might vary from a risk-advert
approach (e.g., any inconclusive decision is interpreted as 0P) to a risk-prone
approach (e.g., if 1P is a possible decision, then the PEP allows the request).
2.3 Maude evaluation
ATRAP uses the term rewriting system Maude [8] to model PTaCL and dy-
namically generate and evaluate requests for a given policy. The syntax for the
PTaCL terms in Maude closely resembles the syntax given above. Based on this
formalisation, we define equations and rewrite rules to manipulate the syntax
tree based on pattern matching.
To evaluate a request, we model the operators for targets, policies and the
three valued logic used in PTaCL. The definition of an operator starts with the
keyword op, followed by a pattern that allows parameters at positions marked
with “ ” (underline), and the signature of the operator after a “:” (colon), where
the list on the left hand side of -> defines the parameters, and the right hand side
the result type. The definition is completed by a “.” (full stop). To exemplify
the notation we give the definitions for decisions and policy operations:
op ALLOW : −> decision .
op DENY : −> decision .
op BOT : −> decision .
op Patom : decision −> policy .
op Pnot : policy −> policy .
op Pdbd : policy −> policy .
op Pand : policy policy −> policy .
The first three lines give parameter-free operators to define the decisions for
1P (ALLOW), 0P (DENY) and ⊥P (BOT) respectively. The decisions are prefixed
with the keyword Patom to form a basic policy, and combined with Pnot, Pdbd
and Pand to form more complex expressions. Similar operators exist for the
targets, where the basic element Tatom holds a key-value pair for the attributes.
While these operators capture the structure of the policies, operators can also
be associated with equations to modify them or evaluate requests. Equations
correspond to operators and are defined using the keyword eq. When one of the
patterns on the left of the = matches, it is replaced by the pattern on the right
hand side.
op dbd : decision −> decision .
eq dbd DENY = DENY .
eq dbd ALLOW = ALLOW .
eq dbd BOT = DENY .
op strongand : decision decision −> decision [assoc comm] .
eq strongand ALLOW d = d .
eq strongand DENY d = DENY .
eq strongand d d = d .
While the deny-by-default operator dbd has only one parameter and replaces
possible BOT values by DENY, the equations can also contain variables which
match all possible patterns for the respective type. The keywords assoc and
comm declare that the operator for strongand is associative and commutative
respectively, which is considered by Maude in pattern matching (e.g., we only
need strongand ALLOW d and can omit strongand d ALLOW). Note that while
in general associative-commutative rewriting is NP complete, Maude supports
effective algorithms for handling the equational rewriting steps for typical pat-
terns in time proportional to the logarithm of the term size [12]. The definitions
for equations are evaluated from top to bottom. That is, for the equations above,
eq strongand d d = d is only considered if both of the parameters are BOT.
In addition to the policies, we define requests as sets of (key =? value) pairs
and an operation peval that evaluates a request on a given policy.
ATRAP uses this formalisation in three ways: to evaluate a request against
a policy, to compute a counter-example demonstrating that a policy is not re-
sistant, and to search for a proof tree that shows the resistance of a policy.
3 Policy Resistance
To introduce the notion of policy resistance, consider the evaluation of the re-
quest {(nat,FR), (nat,AT)} with the policy p1, as given in Table 1: this request,
corresponding to a user with both French and Austrian citizenships, is initially
denied; however, if the attribute (nat, AT) is “removed”, then the request be-
comes allowed.
In general, several reasons can explain the absence of an attribute in a request,
such as an error during the transmission of the attributes, the expiration of the
attribute certificate, the non-existence of this attribute, etc. In particular, an
attribute might be withheld intentionally (e.g., a user does not want to disclose
her address for privacy reasons), by mistake (e.g., a user is not aware of the
fact that it should be disclosed) or maliciously (e.g., a user wants to hide some
“negative” information).
In the latter case, the omission of an attribute can be seen as an attribute
hiding attack [10] from a user, trying to gain a better answer by hiding some
information. A policy is resistant when it is able to resist to such attacks:
Definition 1. A policy p is resistant if, and only if, for any requests q and q′,
if q′ ⊆ q and if JpK(q′) = {1P}, then JpK(q) = {1P}.
In other words, if a request q is not allowed, then any sub-request q′ ⊆ q is also
not allowed. For instance, we can observe that the policy p1 is not resistant,
while the policy p2 is.
There are many ways to prove that a policy p is resistant, the most straight-
forward one being to exhaustively check any pair of requests q, q′ such that
q′ ⊆ q. We describe an implementation of this approach in Section 4 using
Maude, together with the notion of a normal form for requests, allowing us to
reduce the set of requests to check.
In some cases, we can also use the structure of the policy to prove its re-
sistance. For instance, the policy Ptar t (Patom Zero) clearly evaluates, for any
request, either to {0P} or to {0P,⊥}, regardless of the definition of t, and is
therefore trivially resistant. Generalising this example, we can observe (and for-
mally prove) that if a policy cannot return 1P, then it is resistant. Furthermore:
– if p cannot return 1P, then Ptar t p cannot return 1P, for any t;
– if p cannot return 1P, then Pdbd p cannot return 1P;
– if p cannot return 1P, then Pand p p1 and Pand p1 p cannot return 1P;
– if p cannot return 1P, then Pnot p cannot return 0P;
– if p cannot return 0P, then Pnot p cannot return 1P;
– if p cannot return 0P, then Ptar t p cannot return 0P.
In other words, it might be possible to prove that a policy is resistant simply
by inspecting its structure, without checking each possible pair of requests. As
another example, a policy without any target clearly evaluates identically for
any request (since all requests are equally applicable), and therefore is resistant.
In addition, the notion of weak-monotonicity is introduced in [10], such that,
intuitively speaking, a target is weakly monotonic if removing information from
a request lowers the evaluation of the target.
Definition 2. A target t is weakly monotonic if for all requests q and for every
q′ ⊆ q, JtK(q′) 4 JtK(q), where 4 is the reflexive closure of ⊥T ≺ 0T ≺ 1T. A
policy p is weakly monotonic if and only if every target in p is weakly monotonic.
Any atomic target (n, v) is weakly-monotonic, and the operators optT and
andT preserve the weak-monotonicity [10]. In other words, any policy whose
targets are built without the operator notT is weakly monotonic. Moreover, as a
direct result from Theorem 6 of [10] (which is recalled in Appendix 1), we have:
– If p is weakly monotonic and built without dbdP, then it is resistant;
– If p is weakly monotonic and built without notP, then it is resistant;
Finally, the notion of resistance can be proved in a compositional way:
– If p is resistant, then Pdbd p is resistant;
– If p1 and p2 are resistant, then Pand p1 p2 is resistant.
These rules make it possible to prove the resistance of a conjunctive policy in a
different way for each sub-policy. Clearly, all the rules presented in this section
are only implications, and a policy might be resistant even though it does not
satisfy any of them. We show in Section 5 how ATRAP can use these rules,
together with their encoding in Isabelle and Maude, to automatically build a
proof of resistance.
Remark 1. A (strongly) monotonic policy, as defined in [10] is also trivially resis-
tant. However, in order to prove the (strong) monotonicity of an atomic target,
attributes must be assumed to be compact, i.e., either all the values of an at-
tribute are given, or none are. For instance, the compactness of the attribute nat
would mean that a user can either hide all of her nationalities, or none of them,
but cannot only hide one. Hence, proving resistance using (strong) monotonicity
requires the assumption of compactness from the environment, whereas we aim
here at generating complete proofs, i.e., without assumption. The integration of
such assumptions when all other strategies have failed is left for future work.
4 Search for non-resistance
We use the PTaCL encoding in Maude to automatically search for possible
counter-examples to resistance. A naive approach for a policy p would simply
consist in checking any two requests q and q′, such that q′ ⊆ q and JpK(q′) = {1P},
in order to ensure that JpK(q) = {1P}. However, the set of all possible requests can
potentially be very large. For instance, in our previous example, focusing only on
the nat attribute, the United Nations Organisation currently counts 193 mem-
bers3, meaning there are 193 pairs (nat, v) possible, and thus card(Q) = 2193.
In order to simplify the search, we first introduce the normal form of a
request for a given policy. We then describe our correct and complete search for
counter-examples in Maude, and finally we present some experimental results.
4.1 Normal form of requests
Intuitively speaking, the evaluation of a request against a policy mostly depends
on whether the request contains the atomic targets present in the policy: given
an attribute n, all pairs (n, v) that do not explicitly appear in the policy are
evaluated in the same way. For instance, consider the policy p1: it is clear that
the pairs (nat,FR), (nat,DE) or (nat,UK) are evaluated similarly.
Hence, given a policy p, we write A(p) for the set of atomic targets appearing
in p. For instance, A(p1) = {(nat,AT)} and A(p2) = {(nat,FR)}. Given an
attribute n and a policy, we write fv(p, n) for a fresh value of n with respect to
p, i.e., a value such that (n, fv(p, n)) 6∈ A(p). If p explicitly mentions all possible
values for n, we define fv(p, n) to return a random value for n. Finally, the normal
form of a request q for a policy p is given by keeping all pairs (n, v) that appear
both in q and A(p), and replacing any (n, v) in q that does not appear in A(p)
by (n, fv(p, n)). More formally:
3 http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/whatisms.shtml#states
Definition 3. The normal form of a request q is given by:
nfp(q) = (q ∩ A(p)) ∪ {(n, fv(p, n)) | ∃v (n, v) 6∈ A(p) ∧ (n, v) ∈ q}
Given a set of requests Q and a policy p, we write NFp(Q) = {nfp(q) | q ∈ Q}. In
the following, we omit the subscript when p is clear from context. For instance,
the set of requests in normal form for the policy p1 is given by:
NFp1(Q) = {∅, {(nat,AT)}, {(nat,NV)}, {(nat,NV), (nat,AT)}}
where NV represents the fresh value for the attribute nat, i.e., NV = fv(p1,nat).
This notion of normal is consistent both with policy evaluation and request
inclusion (the proofs can be found in Appendix B).
Proposition 1 For any policy p and any request q, JpK(q) = JpK(nf(q)).
Proposition 2 Given any requests q and q′, if q′ ⊆ q, then nf(q′) ⊆ nf(q).
Remark 2. The simplicity of the normal form comes from the fact that PTaCL
does not allow for complex atomic targets, such as the comparison of attribute
values. For instance, one cannot directly write the atomic target stating that age
must be lower than 18, and must instead generate the disjunction of all atomic
target for age between 0 and 18. Note however that, as long as attributes have
a finite domain, all possible targets can be defined, hence PTaCL can be seen
here as a low-level language, designed for policy analysis. The design of richer
atomic targets is planned for future work.
4.2 Search for counter-examples
As a consequence of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, the resistance of a policy
can be decided only by looking at the set of requests in normal form.
Proposition 3 A policy p is resistant if, and only if, given q and q′ in NFp(Q),
if q′ ⊆ q and if JpK(q′) = {1P}, then JpK(q) = {1P}.
In other words, we can restrict our attention to NFp(Q), whose size is bounded
by 2|A(p)|+n, where n stands for the number of attributes, instead of Q, whose
size is 2N , where N is the number of all possible attribute name-values pairs.
Finally, it is worth observing that, in order for a policy p to be resistant, it is
enough to check, for any allowed request q, whether removing any pair attribute
value changes the decision. More formally:
Proposition 4 A policy p is resistant if, and only if, for any request q such thatJpK(q) 6= {1P}, if JpK(q \ {(n, v)}) 6= {1P}, for any attribute n and any value v.
Combining Propositions 4 and 3, we conclude that to find a counter-example
to resistance, we only need to check all pairs (q, q′), where q, q′ ∈ NFp(Q) and q =
q′∪{(n, v)}. Proposition 4 allows us to reduce the number of comparisons needed
for the search for counter-examples from an upper bound of 2|A(p)|+n×2|A(p)|+n
(comparison of all subsets) to 2|A(p)|+n × (|A(p)| + n), i.e., where each subset
needs to be checked against at most |A(p)|+ n direct subsets.
The seach for counter-examples is performed by generating and evaluating
the largest possible request qm = A(p) ∪ {(n, fv(n)) | (n, v) ∈ A(p)}, and sys-
tematically removing attributes to see if a reduction of a request (hiding of an
attribute) can lead to an increase of access in the policy. This manipulation of
requests is performed using rewrite rules, which are defined similarly to equa-
tions, but in contrast to them are not evaluated deterministically, i.e., may be
executed whenever the left hand side pattern matches.
The Maude command for the search has the following form:
search sres ( bldevallist ( policy Requests Defs DecsList ) ) =>∗ error ( x:DecsList ) .
where policy is the ID of a top level policy to check, the set Requests is the max-
imal request in normal form, and Defs are the policy definitions. The operator
bldevallist repeatedly removes attribues from the request, evaluates it with re-
spect to the policy, and stores the result in DecsList. The operator sres traverses
the list and searches for pairs that violate resistance, in which case the violating
request pair is wrapped into an error operator. Removing an element from the
set Request is nondeterministic, and thus may generate different lists of decisions.
The maude command search systematically explores all the possible outcomes
and returns those that match the search command, resp. can be rewritten to an
error label. For instance, when analysing the policy p1, ATRAP outputs:
Counter-example #1
["nat" =? "new_value"]: [ALLOW]
["nat" =? "AT", "nat" =? "new_value"]: [DENY]
4.3 Experimental Results
We experiment the search for counter-examples by randomly generating some
policies, and executing the search for each policy. We write P 〈m,n, k, l, r〉 for
a set of r random policies, such that m stands for the maximal height of each
policy, n for the maximal width of each target, k for the number of attributes
and l for the number of values for each attribute.
Figure 2 represents the execution time (on 2 GHz Intel core i7 with 8GB
of RAM) for the search of counter-examples for each p ∈ P 〈4, 4, 4, 4, 300〉, in-
dexed by A(p) and with a logarithmic scale for the execution time. Over the
300 policies, 252 are resistant, and this ratio of 0.85 is consistent with other
experiments, and seems to be independent of the policy dimensions. Note that
the times shown in this Figure are for complete searches, i.e., searches finding
all possible counter-examples. Hence, the time required to analyse a policy is
the same whether the policy is resistant or not. As expected from the theoretical
analysis of the previous section, the search for counter is exponential in the size
of A(p).
Fig. 2. Automatic search for counter-examples for P 〈4, 4, 4, 4, 300〉
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5 Certification of resistance
If no counter-example is found, ATRAP tries to build a proof of resistance of
the policy, following a proof-obligation discharge approach, where Maude is used
to automatically generate a proof that can be checked in Isabelle [19, 24]. To
reach this goal, ATRAP encodes the policy and the deduction mechanism in
rewrite logic and calls Maude to perform a search for the proof. The result is
parsed into Java classes and mapped into a corresponding proof in Isabelle, which
is then called to validate the proof. It is worth mentioning that the encoding
in Maude of the deduction mechanism is independent to the counter-examples
search described in the previous section, although both techniques share the
encoding of PTaCL.
Our approach revolves around two main entities: proof obligation and proof
technique. A proof obligation corresponds to a goal, i.e., to a property that we
want to prove. The top-level goal is a proof of resistance, which in turn may
require further sub-goals like weak-monotonicity to form a complete proof tree.
A proof technique describes a method to discharge a proof obligation, using some
rules described in Section 3.
Rather than encoding the proofs manually in Isabelle, we use Maude to
search for viable proof trees that are then encoded and checked in Isabelle.
To facilitate this goal, each proof obligation and technique have corresponding
facets in Maude, Isabelle and Java. In Maude, the facet of a proof obligation
is represented as an operator (e.g., isResistant) that takes a policy or target ID
and a proof technique. In Java this is implemented in form of public classes,
which have a field statement corresponding to the Isabelle definition of the proof
obligation. For instance, the field statement of the class ResistanceProof is equal
to resistant p q1 q, where p is the name of the policy over which this class is
defined and where q and q1 are the universally quantified variables representing
the variables q and q′ of Definition 1. The Isabelle facet of a proof obligation is
then a definition over either a target or a policy. For instance, the definition of
resistance in Isabelle is given as:
definition resistant :: ”policy ⇒ request ⇒ request ⇒ bool” where
” resistant p q1 q ≡ (set q1)⊆(set q) → peval p q1 = {One} → peval p q = {One}”
The Maude facet of a proof technique is an operator defined over policies
and/or targets. For instance, let r1 be the rule stating that a policy is resis-
tant if it is weakly-monotonic and without the notP operator. Note that for
technical reasons, we also need to impose that a policy is well-formed, i.e.,
each atomic policy is either 1P or 0P, and not ⊥P. This rule is represented
in Maude as the operator ResWFWMWNProof. A proof technique is implemented
in Java as a class local to that corresponding to the proof obligation. For in-
stance, in order to define the rule r1, the class ResistanceProof comes with a
local class WeakMonotonicityWithoutNotWF. This class is defined with three fields:
WellFormedProof, WithoutNotProof, WeakMonotonicPolicyProof, each being a public
class. In other words, in order to use the rule r1, one must first exhibit a proof
that the policy is well-formed, a proof that it is built without the notP construc-
tor, and a proof that it is weakly-monotonic. Finally, this structure is mapped
to Isabelle, where the proof technique for a proof obligation is a proven lemma
whose goal is that proof obligation. For instance, the lemma corresponding to
rule r1 is defined in Isabelle as:
lemma weak monotonic without not resistant :
” well formed policy p ⇒ weak pmonotonic p q1 q ⇒ policy without not p
⇒ resistant p q1 q”
To generate the proof tree, each rule of Section 3 is modelled in Maude in
a basic, compositional form. Starting from the initial goal of proving resistance
of a policy p, the proof generation then follows the structure of the policy to
generate new proof obligations for sub-proofs according to the components and
properties of p.
While binary operators like Pand trigger sub-proofs for both operands, the
proof generation is also guided by properties and preconditions of the lemma
to apply. To show, e.g., resistance using the rule r1, we need to establish well-
formedness, weak-monotonicity, and check that the policy does not use notP.
Well-formedness and use of notP can easily be checked by Maude doing a syn-
tactic check. Only if both conditions are fulfilled, a proof for weak monotonicity
is instantiated. When all conditions for a proof are fulfilled, the proof obligation
is replaced by a description of the actual proof. For instance, the rewrite rule
corresponding to the rule r1 is given as:
genproof( isResistant (p, noproof) ,
isWF(p, pr1), isWN(p, pr2), isWM(p, pr3),pis | defs )
=> genproof(isResistant(p, ResWFWMWNProof(p)),
isWF(p, pr1), isWN(p, pr2), isWM(p, pr3), pis | defs)
where noproof indicates that the proof obligation was not fulfilled yet, and pr1, pr2,
and pr3 are previously generated subproofs. The variables pis and defs hold the
Fig. 3. Generated Isabelle Proof
theory p2 imports atrap begin
definition t2 :: target where ”t2 = (Tatom ’’nat’’ ’’ FR’’)”
definition pone :: policy where ”pone = Patom One”
definition pt :: policy where ”pt = Ptar t2 pone”
definition p2 :: policy where ”p2 = Pdbd pt”
lemma ”resistant p2 q1 q” proof −
have wf: ” well formed policy p2”
by (simp add: p2 def pt def pone def t2 def )
have without not: ” policy without not p2”
by (simp add: p2 def pt def pone def t2 def )
have weak monotonic: ”weak pmonotonic p2 q1 q” proof −
have wm p: ”weak pmonotonic pt q1 q” proof −
have wm p: ”weak pmonotonic pone q1 q” by (simp add: pone def)
have wm t: ”weak tmonotonic t2 q1 q”
by (simp add: tatom weak monotonic t2 def)
from wm p wm t show ?thesis by (simp add:pt def) qed
from wm p show ?thesis by (simp add:p2 def) qed
from wf without not weak monotonic show ?thesis
by ( insert weak monotonic without not resistant [of p2 q1 q] , simp)
qed
available sub-proofs and policy definitions respectively. This approach also allows
for manual intervention by the user by supplying the generation mechanism by
external information about the system or predefining proof obligations with their
respective techniques.
Running Example. The policy p2 is automatically proven to be resistant by
ATRAP, which executes the following Maude command (where the policy pt is
introduced as an intermediary step):
rew genproof( isResistant (P ”p2”, noproof) | (T ”t2”::(Tatom ”nat” ”FR”),
P ”pone”=Patom ALLOW, P ”pt”=Ptar T ”t2” P ”pone”, P ”p2”=Pdbd P ”pt”)).
This proof-obligation is automatically discharged using the rules described above,
and the following proof-obligation is returned:
isResistant (P ”p2”, ResWFWMWNProof(P ”p2”)), isWF(P ”p2”, WFBFProof(P ”p2”)),
isWN(P ”p2”, WNBFProof(P ”p2”)), isWM(P ”p2”, WMPdbd(P ”p2”,P ”pt”)),
isWM(P ”pt”, WMwithPtar(P ”pt”,T ”t2”,P ”pone”)),
isWM(T ”t2” ,WMwithTAtom(T ”t2”)), isWM(P ”pone”, WMwithPAtom(P ”pone”)))
Informally, this proof can be read as follows: p2 is resistant, since it is well-
formed, weakly-monotonic and without-not; p2 is well-formed which can checked
by “brute-force”, i.e., by checking the definition of p2; p2 is without the notP
operator, which can also be checked by “brute-force”; p2 is weakly-monotonic,
since it is the deny-by-default of the weakly-monotonic policy pt; pt is weakly-
monotonic, since it is the composition of the weakly-monotonic target t2 and
of the weakly-monotonic policy pone; t2 is weakly-monotonic, since it is atomic;
and pone is weakly-monotonic since it is atomic.
ATRAP parses this Maude proof-obligation, and using the Java mechanism
described above, the following Isabelle theory is automatically generated. This
theory is built on the logic atrap .thy, which includes the definition of the three-
valued logic, the definition of PTaCL, and the lemmas corresponding to the
different rules described in Section 3.
Fig. 3 presents the generated proof for the running example. For the sake
of compactness, we do not go through Isabelle/Isar’s syntax, but intuitively,
the structure of the proof follows the informal description given above, and the
tactics used are limited to the simplification tactic (which unfolds the definition
of the entities involved in the proof), and the insertion of existing lemmas. It is
worth observing that the generated proof is human readable, and is structurally
very close to the corresponding mathematical proof. We believe this aspect to
be particularly important as a security designer is not necessarily an expert in
proof techniques, and ATRAP provides a high-level proof, without having to
rely blindly on a verification tool.
5.1 Experimental results
We now evaluate the performance of ATRAP for the generation of resistance
proof. The complexity of the proof generation mostly depends on the number
of constructors of a policy p, which we refer to by size(p), since the number of
applicable rules directly depends on that number. Figure 4 shows some evalua-
tion times for P 〈8, 3, 3, 3, 500〉, where the y axis is logarithmic. As expected, the
complexity of the proof search is exponential in size(p), making the proof search
most of the time faster than the search for counter-examples (the few exceptions
to that rule come from policies p with large sizes, but small A(p), i.e., policies
where a same target is repeated a large number of times).
However, although usually faster than the counter-examples search, the ac-
curacy of the proof generation decreases with size(p). For instance, writing Tn
for P 〈n, n, 2, 2, 1000〉, for T1, we generated the proof for all of the 957 resistant
policies, this ratio falls to 905/920 ≈ 0.98 for T2, to 762/883 ≈ 0.86 for T3, to
659/864 ≈ 0.76 for T4, to 558/852 ≈ 0.66 for T5, to 503/861 ≈ 0.58 for T6, etc.
Theses results, together with those of Section 4.3, should be seen as a val-
idation of the ATRAP approach, rather than a “real-world” characterisation
of policy resistance. Indeed, the policies analysed are randomly generated, and
therefore the samples do not necessarily represent policies defined in a concrete
context. In particular, it is not necessarily the case that about 85% of the policies
enforced in existing information systems are resistant. Similarly, even though the
accuracy of the proof search decreases with the number of constructors used, a
very large policy whose targets consist only of conjunctions of atomic targets,
and using only the operator andP, could be easily proved resistant.
Fig. 4. Automatic search for proof for P 〈8, 3, 3, 3, 500〉
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6 Conclusion - Future work
This paper presents the tool ATRAP, which, given a PTaCL policy, is capable
of positively answer the three questions stated in the Introduction, i.e., can
automatically detect the resistance of a policy by exhibiting a counter-example
when it is not resistant, and, in some cases, by generating an Isabelle proof when
it is. The different mechanisms are illustrated with two simple policies.
Using Proposition 3, we are able to limit the number of requests to evalu-
ate when searching a counter-example, while maintaining the correctness and
completeness of the approach. We have also implemented a collection of proof
techniques allowing to prove efficiently the resistance of a policy, although large
policies might fail to be proven automatically. However, the rules presented in
Section 3 can also be seen as a policy construction guide, since a policy built
using only those rules is resistant, by construction.
An interesting lead to explore for future work is to increase the interactivity
between the search for counter-examples and the proof generation, by leveraging
the different complexity of each approach. More precisely, we should take ad-
vantage of Maude to rewrite a policy to an equivalent one, such that the latter
policy could be proven to be resistant more easily. This leads to the question of
the existence of a normal form for policies, such that one could build a complete
collection of resistance rules, i.e., if a policy in normal form is resistant, then
there exists a set of structural proofs to prove it. At this stage, this remains as
an open question.
We however believe that one of the strengths of our approach is its flexibility,
and rules can be incrementally added. In order to so, one needs to provide the
corresponding rule in Maude, together with Isabelle lemma and the Java class
linking the two. Clearly, an interesting future work would consist in formalising
this extendability, by having an explicit, abstract notion of rule, with multiple
facets, i.e., one facet for Maude, one for Isabelle, one for Java. We could also
extend our approach to other properties of access control policies, for instance
by relying on the underlying properties of the rewrite system [4].
Another relevant problem is the one of fixing a policy, in order to transform
a non-resistant policy into a resistant one. This problem raises the question of
policy “closeness”, i.e., given a non-resistant policy, it is not enough to create
a resistant one, we also need to ensure that the new policy is close enough to
the original one. It is worth noting that ATRAP can generate partial proof of
resistance, i.e., even if the whole policy is not resistant, it might identify some
sub-policies that are, which might be helpful to fix a given policy.
Finally, as we mentioned, the current version of PTaCL can be seen as a
low level language, and it would therefore be worth interfacing a “higher” level
language with PTaCL, in order to analyse more complex policies, for instance
include relational targets. XACML 3.0 would be a good candidate for such an
extension, since both languages are attribute and target-based. In general, we
plan to release ATRAP as an open-source software, and to generally optimise
the searches for counter-examples and proofs. In this regard, it would be worth
looking at parallel/distributed computation, since the evaluation of each pair of
requests (q, q \ {(n, v)} can be performed independently.
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A Original PTaCL theorem
For the ease of reading of this paper, we restate here the theorem about the
weak-monotonicity of [10].
Theorem 1 Let p be a policy whose policy tree contains weakly monotonic tar-
gets t1, . . . , tk and let q be a request.
1. If p is constructed from the operators notP and andP, then for any q
′ ⊆ q, ifJpK(q′) = {d}, with d ∈ {1P, 0P}, then JpK(q) = JpK(q′).
2. If p is constructed from the operators dbdP and andP, then for any q
′ ⊆ q,
if JpK(q′) = {1P}, then JpK(q) = {1P}.
B Proofs
Proposition 1 For any policy p and any request q, JpK(q) = JpK(nf(q)).
Proof First, let us observe that, by direct induction, given two requests q and
q′ and a policy p, if for any (n, v) ∈ A(p), if J(n, v)K(q) = J(n, v)K(q′), thenJpK(q) = JpK(q′).
We now proceed in two steps: we first show that given any (n, v) in A(p) ifJ(n, v)K(q) = d, then J(n, v)K(nf(q)) = d, and then we show that the converse
holds, which allows us to conclude.
Given any (n, v) ∈ A(p), three cases are possible for J(n, v)K(q):
– J(n, v)K(q) = 1T, and in this case (n, v) ∈ q, meaning that (n, v) ∈ nf(q), and
therefore that J(n, v)K(nf(q)) = 1T.
– J(n, v)K(q) = 0T, and in this case, we first have (n, v) 6∈ q, implying that
(n, v) 6∈ nf(q). Furthermore, there exists v′ such that (n, v′) ∈ q, and thus
either (n, v′) ∈ A(p), in which case (n, v′) also belongs to nf(q) and we
can conclude that J(n, v)K(nf(q)) = 0T, or (n, v′) 6∈ A(p), in which case
(n, fv(n)) ∈ nf(q). Since fvn 6= v, we can conclude that J(n, v)K(nf(q)) = 0T.
– J(n, v)K(q) = ⊥T, and in this case, there does not exists any v′ such that
(n, v′) belongs to q, meaning that there does exist any v′ such that (n, v′)
belongs to nf(q), and so we can conclude that J(n, v)K(nf(q)) = ⊥T.
Similarly, given any (n, v) ∈ A(p), three cases are possible for J(n, v)K(nf(q)):
– J(n, v)K(nf(q)) = 1T, and in this case (n, v) ∈ nf(q), meaning that (n, v) ∈ q
(since f 6= fv(n) and therefore that J(n, v)K(q) = 1T.
– J(n, v)K(nf(q)) = 0T, and in this case, we first have (n, v) 6∈ nf(q), implying
that (n, v) 6∈ q. Furthermore, there exists v′ such that (n, v′) ∈ nf(q), and
thus either (n, v′) ∈ q, in which case we can conclude that J(n, v)K(q) = 0T,
or v′ = fv(n), in which case, there exists v′′ such that (n, v′′) ∈ q, and we
can also conclude that J(n, v)K(q) = 0T.
– J(n, v)K(q) = ⊥T, and in this case, there does not exists any v′ such that
(n, v′) belongs to nf(q), meaning that there does exist any v′ such that (n, v′)
belongs to q, and so we can conclude that J(n, v)K(q) = ⊥T.
uunionsq
Proposition 2 Given any requests q and q′ and any policy p, if q′ ⊆ q, then
nfp(q
′) ⊆ nfp(q).
Proof Let q and q′ be two requests such that q′ ⊆ q, let (n, v) ∈ nf(q′) and let
us show that (n, v) ∈ nf(q). Indeed, two cases are possible:
– either (n, v) ∈ q′, which means that (n, v) ∈ A(p). Since q′ ⊆ q, we know
that (n, v) ∈ q, and we can therefore conclude that (n, v) ∈ nf(q);
– or (n, v) 6∈ q′, which means that v = fv(n). In this case, there exists v′ such
that (n, v′) 6∈ A(p) and (n, v′) ∈ q′. Since q′ ⊆ q, we also have (n, v′) ∈ q,
and since (n, v′) 6∈ A(p), we can conclude that (n, fv(n)) ∈ q.
uunionsq
Proposition 3 A policy p is resistant if, and only if, given q and q′ in NFp(Q),
if q′ ⊆ q and if JpK(q′) = {1P}, then JpK(q) = {1P}.
Proof Since NFp(Q) ⊆ Q, the implication is immediate. We show that it is
enough to restrict our attention to NFp(Q) by contraposition: if p is not resistant,
then there exists q and q′ such that q′ ⊆ q, JpK(q′) = {1P} and JpK(q) 6= {1P}.
From Proposition 2, we have that nf(q′) ⊆ nf(q), and from Proposition 1, we have
that JpK(nf(q′)) = {1P} and JpK(nf(q)) 6= {1P}, thus allowing us to conclude. uunionsq
Proposition 4 A policy p is resistant if, and only if, for any request q such thatJpK(q) 6= {1P}, if JpK(q \ {(n, v)}) 6= {1P}, for any attribute n and any value v.
Proof Since (q \{(n, v)}) ⊆ q, the implication is trivial. Now, consider a policy
p such that for any q such that JpK(q) 6= {1P}, we have JpK(q \ {(n, v)}) 6= {1P},
for any attribute n and any value v, and let us show that p is resistant.
Let q, q′ be two requests such that q′ ⊆ q and JpK(q) 6= {1P}, and let us show
that JpK(q′) 6= {1P}. In order to do so, we prove by induction that for any k,
for any (ni, vi), with 0 6 i 6 k, we have JpK(q \ {(n1, v1), . . . , (nk, vk)}) 6= {1P},
which will allow us to conclude, since q′ ⊆ q.
When k = 0, we have q \ ∅ = q, and we can conclude by the assumption thatJpK(q) 6= {1P}. Let us now write q′′ = q \{(n1, v1), . . . , (nk, vk)} and assume thatJpK(q′′) 6= {1P}; we can show that JpK(q′′\{(nk+1, vk+1)}) 6= {1P} by assumption
over p, thus allowing us to conclude our induction proof, and therefore that p is
resistant. uunionsq
C External files
The repository http://www.morisset.eu/atrap/ lists the file header.maude,
which contains all the maude definitions used in ATRAP; logic.thy, which con-
tains the encoding of the 3-valued logic in Isabelle; ptacl.thy, which contains
the encoding of PTaCL in Isabelle; atrap.thy, which contains the encoding
of the proof techniques described in Section 3 and p2.thy, which is the proof
generated in Section 5.
